not altogether negligible. Moreover, the evacuation of Monastir will have a most depressing effect on the morale of the Serbian Army, and it is to be feared that the troops composing this already dwindling force may become so discouraged as to desert the colours and scatter to their homes. In any case, the Serbian Army has always shown itself superior in offence to defence. Thus, by withdrawing to a shorter line, the Allies run the risk not only of a further serious weakening, but possibly of an actual diminution of their forces in the Balkan theatre. Withdrawal from Monastir, and the entry of the enemy into Greece, will inflict a moral blow on the cause of the Allies, which cannot fail to exercise a most unfortunate influence both on our own peoples and on neutral nations.

11. *There is yet another course which the Central Powers may adopt. They may turn the mass of their manoeuvre army upon the Italian Front, either before*

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of Italy or alternatively, with the Army of the East.

Are we to look on as anxious but impotent spectators whilst Germany destroys our friends one after another ? This is our present position in reference to Roumania.

12. Now what, I ask, are the plans of the Allies for meeting any of these contingencies ? No doubt

Lack of General Gourko,

General Sarrail and General Cadorna has each an admirable plan of his own for meeting the contingency. But what is the plan of the Allies as a whole? The combined offensive against Bulgaria, planned at Chantilly, is no longer practicable and so far as we know the Allies have absolutely no plan,

* This is exactly what happened later on at Caporetto.